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Marks: The New York State Taylor Law: Does One Size Fit All?

NOTE
THE NEW YORK STATE TAYLOR LAW:
DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Let's go back in time. Imagine you are a New York State public
school teacher in the early 1950s, only a few decades ago.' You are
underpaid and often moved around to other schools in a factory-style
system where you have no right to bargain for better treatment. 2 You are
not able to join together with other public school teachers in a union to
fight for more acceptable conditions as a single unit. 3 Although there is a
federal law that protects employees in the private sector,' there is not a
comparable state or federal law to protect your rights as a public sector
employee. You are at a standstill, and it is because collective bargaining
and striking are prohibited in the public sector.
Although private sector employees began to receive labor law
protections in the 193Os,7 public sector employees did not receive many
of these rights until almost thirty years later. There continued to be

1. See Sol Stem, How Teachers' Unions HandcuffSchools, CITY J. (1997), https://www.cityjoumal.org/html/how-teachers'-unions-handcuff-schools-12102.html.

2. Id.
3. Agustina S. Paglayan, Here's the Real Reason Teachers Are Revolting in Red States,
WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/02/h
eres-the-real-reason-teachers-are-revolting-in-red-states.
4. Which Employees Are ProtectedUnder the NLRA?, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://ww
(last visited May 18,
w.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb/which-employees-are-protected-under-nlra

2020).
5. See Charles J. Russo, Teachers Unions, the Right to Work, and Fair-ShareAgreements,
82 ASS'N OF SCH. Bus. OFFICIALS INT'L 37, 37 (Jan. 2016), http://www.naylometwork.com/asbnwl/pdf/SBAJanuary_2016_TeachersUnions_theRight toWork,_andFair-ShareAgreements

.pdf.
6.
7.

See Paglayan,supra note 3.
See Laura J. Cooper, A Research Guide to the Law ofPrivate Sector Labor-Management

Relations, 79 U. MINN. L. LBR. J. 387, 389-90 (1987).
New
York State Taylor Law: History, CORNELL UNIV.,
8. M.E.
Warner,
http://www.mildredwamer.org/gov-restructuring/special-projects/taylor-law (last visited May 18,

2020).
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9
restrictions on public school teachers' ability to strike, even as public
sector employees began to receive the right to join a union and
collectively bargain.o Lawmakers in cities across the country slowly
began passing laws designed with the goal of specifically protecting the
rights of public sector employees, and many states followed suit."
Beginning with the state of Wisconsin in 1959,12 various state
legislatures passed labor laws to address the increasing need and desire
for public sector collective bargaining, including the state of New York
in 1967."
In New York State, the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
which is more commonly known as the Taylor Law, governs public
sector employers and employees. 14 Aside from banning strikes, and
imposing a severe penalty on employees who do choose to strike, the
Taylor Law also outlines a process for when a collective bargaining
dispute between a public sector employer and employee occurs, resulting
in negotiations at a standstill." The Taylor Law applies when a public
sector employer and employee cannot reach an agreement during the
16
collective bargaining process, thus creating an impasse.
Currently, the Taylor Law has two distinct ways of handling an
impasse that depends on whether the dispute is between a public
employer and employee in the emergency service sector, or whether the
conflict is between an employer and employee in the public education
sector."
While emergency workers, including police officers and

9.

See generally Education Week Staff, Teacher Strikes: 4 Common Questions, EDUC.WK.

(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/teacher-strike/index.html.
10. Lawrence Mishel, Evidence Shows Collective Bargaining-Especiallywith the Ability to
Strike-Raises Teacher Pay, ECON. POL'Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2018, 1:41 PM),

https://www.epi.org/blog/evidence-shows-collective-bargaining-especially-with-the-ability-to-strike
-raises-teacher-pay.

11. Joseph A. McCartin, What's Really Going on in Wisconsin?, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 19,
2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/83829/wisconsin-public-employees-walker-negotiate (noting
that New York City and Philadelphia were two of the first cities that enacted legislation recognizing
public sector collective bargaining).
12. Id.
13. Tim Anderson, Fight Over Future of Collective Bargaining Laws Has Just Begun,
COUNCIL ST. GOVERNMENTS (Apr. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content
/fight-over-future-collective-bargaining-laws-has-just-begun; Warner, supranote 8.
14. Deidre McFadyen, The History of the Taylor Law, UNITED FED'N OF TCHRS. (June 9,

2005), web.archive.org/web/20110115100909/http://www.uft.org/labor-spotlight/history-taylor-law.
15. Arvid Anderson et al., Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining-An
Examination of Compulsory InterestArbitration in New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 453, 454-55

(1977).
16. N.Y. Ctv. SERV. LAW § 209(1) (McKinney 2020) (finding that an impasse "exist[s] if the
parties fail to achieve agreement at least one hundred twenty days prior to the end of the fiscal year
of the public employer").
17.

Jason A. Zwara, Left in the Dark: How New York's Taylor Law Impairs Collective

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss3/11
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firefighters, are subject to final and binding arbitration when an impasse
occurs, members of the public education sector are only given the
voluntary option to attend arbitration, which is not final or binding on
either party.)8 The Taylor Law does not impose a sanction or penalty on
employers or teachers' unions in the public education sector for not
attending arbitration, or for failing to implement an arbitrator's decision
if the parties do attend the currently non-binding and non-mandatory
arbitration. 1 9Thus, if an impasse occurs and either party does not want
to attend arbitration, or the parties do attend arbitration but do not
implement the arbitrator's recommendation, the parties could potentially
never reach a new agreement.2 0
This Note argues that the Taylor Law, in enforcing binding
arbitration on the emergency service sector and detailing a vague and
complicated voluntary arbitration process for the public education
sector, creates a grave inequality between two groups that in all other
aspects must operate in the same way, under the same law. 2 1 In its
current form, the Taylor Law has a multitude of fundamental flaws that
previously has, and still can, place segments of the public education
sector into a so-called 'limbo' during collective bargaining negotiation
disputes. 2 2 Presently, the Taylor Law not only enforces an unfair
procedure that the public education sector must follow, but it also
effectively creates a sharp division among the public sector, in which
public educators are deemed to provide non-essential services to the
general public, even though over two and a half million New York
public school students rely on these educators each day.2 3
This Note begins with a brief discussion of the history of the
National Labor Relations Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, two federal labor
laws that are geared to the private sector.2 4 Part II also examines the
historical background of New York's Taylor Law and the Triborough
Bargaining,31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 193, 235 (2013).
18. CIv. SERV. § 209(3); Robert F. Worth, The Transit Showdown; The Taylor Law; A
Powerful Tool to Use Against Striking Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/13/nyregion/transit-showdown-taylor-law-powerful-tool-use-aga

inst-striking-employees.html.
19. Risa L. Lieberwitz et al., Panel: Public Sector Labor Relations in Higher Education:
Distinctive Issues in Higher Education under the Taylor Law at "The Taylor Law at 50" New York
State Bar Association Conference (May 10, 2018), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsse

t.aspx?id=82425.
20. Id.
21.

Zwara, supra note 17, at 229; see infra Part III.

22. Anderson et al., supra note 15, at 459, 508.
23.

NY

State

Public

School

Enrollment,

N.Y.

ST.

EDUC.

DEP'T,

https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year-2017&stateyes (last visited May 18, 2020).
24. See infra Part II.A.
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Amendment, which was passed in an attempt to resolve some of the
Taylor Law's inherent flaws.2 5 Part III discusses a relevant and
significant collective bargaining dispute that occurred in Buffalo, New
York, which directly represents the problem with the Taylor Law in its
current form. 2 6 Additionally, Part III considers the implications of a very
recent United States Supreme Court decision that has already minimized
the power of public sector unions.2 7 Part III of this Note also explains the
underlying issues of the current impasse resolution procedure and
provisions of the Taylor Law and the impact of the present non-binding
and non-mandatory arbitration process on the public education sector.2 8
Part IV discusses the public policy arguments in favor of and against
amending the Taylor Law, and addresses how the proposed solution will
solve a problem that has created inequality and unfairness for a large
29
portion of the New York State public sector for over fifty years. Part
IV also examines how two other states have adopted legislation
regarding the public sector's right to strike and collectively bargain, and
describes how these states' labor laws can be used as models for and as a
comparison with an amended Taylor Law in New York State.3 0 Finally,
Part IV proposes solving this issue by first removing section 209(3)(f) of
the Taylor Law in full, and then amending section 209(4) of the Taylor
Law to eliminate its current categorization between emergency workers
and the public education sector by imposing a single collective
bargaining dispute procedure, and creating a mandatory and binding
arbitration process for the entire public sector.3 1
II.

U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE LABOR LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY

There has been immense development in the creation and
expansion of labor laws over the past century.3 2 From the passage of the
first national labor law, which was geared toward the private sector, to
the passage of a multitude of state labor laws, which were geared toward
the public sector in the following years, labor law has come a long
way. 3 3 However, some state labor laws, including New York's Taylor

infra Part II.B.
infra Part I.A.
infra Part III.B.
infra Part I.C.
infra Part IVA.
infra Part IV.B.1-2.
infra Part IV.C.
Graham Boone, Labor Law Highlights, 1915-2015, Monthly Labor Review, U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Oct. 2015), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2015.38.
33. Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
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Law, can still be improved and should be amended to address and
remedy the current inequality in the public sector collective bargaining
arena. 3 4 First, this Part discusses the reasons the National Labor
Relations Act was passed to benefit both private sector employers and
employees. 3 This Part also discusses how this Act, along with the
federal Taft-Hartley Act that was passed only a few years later,
contributed to the rise of states' initiatives to pass their own labor laws
that apply to the public sector.3 6 Lastly, this Part describes the history of
the Taylor Law, including how the Taylor Law defines the rights and
limitations of public sector employees in New York, and examines why
the Triborough Amendment was enacted by the New York legislature in
an attempt to combat some of the Taylor Law's reoccurring faults.3 7
A.

FederalLabor Laws Lead the Way

Congress enacted the Wagner Act, also known as the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), in 1935." The NLRA was Congress'
second attempt at creating a national labor law because the United States
Supreme Court struck down Congress' first labor law, the National
Industrial Recovery Act, only two years after it was enacted.3 9 The
NLRA, which similarly only covers the private sector, does not apply to
public sector employers or employees. 40
The NLRA was designed to protect the rights of private sector
employees. 4 1 For example, under the NLRA, it is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee for belonging to a union
or engaging in union activities. 4 2 The NLRA also grants private sector
employees the right to strike and bargain collectively, which has led to

34. See generally Ken Girardin, Senate Set to OK Union Trap Law, EMPIRE CTR. (Jan. 12,
2018), https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/senate-set-to-ok-union-trap-law (discussing how
even half a century after the Taylor Law was implemented to grant public unionization in New
York, there is currently proposed legislation in New York State to amend the Taylor Law).

35. See infta Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.A.
37.
38.

See infra Part I.B.
Wagner Act, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Wagner-

Act (last updated Feb. 26, 2020).
39. Robert P. Hunter, The National Labor Relations Act and the Growth of OrganizedLabor,
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y (Aug. 24, 1999), https://www.mackinac.org/2306. Although the
National Industrial Recovery Act gave private sector employees the right to organize unions and
collectively bargain, it did not provide for a mechanism to implement these rights. Id

40. Id.
41. NationalLabor RelationsAct, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources

/national-labor-relations-act-nlra (last visited May 18, 2020).
42. NationalLabor RelationsAct (NLRA), EM. L. HANDBOOK, https://www.employmentlaw

handbook.com/federal-employment-and-labor-laws/nlra (last visited May 18, 2020).
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many of these employees actively seeking and obtaining union
membership. 43 Additionally, the NLRA set up the National
Labor Relations Board, an independent agency with the authority
to enforce private sector employees' rights and resolve collective
bargaining disputes through hearings and recommended orders." In a
close 5-to-4 decision in 1937,4 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NLRA, which spelled out a victory for private
sector unions and laid the foundation for greater rights and protections
for private sector employees.46
Only a decade after the NLRA was declared constitutional,4 7
Congress drafted the Labor Management Relations Act, more commonly
known as the Taft-Hartley Act.4 8 There was much speculation
surrounding the idea that some members of Congress viewed unions as
greedy under the NLRA, so they wanted to balance the powers of labor
unions and employers by enacting a new law to curtail some of the
unions' perceived power.4 9 President Harry S. Truman, who was
opposed to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, explained his veto of the
bill as follows: "The bill taken as a whole would reverse the basic
direction of our national labor policy... . It would contribute neither to

industrial peace nor to economic stability and progress. . .. [T]he bill
50
Congress
violates principles essential to our public welfare."
nevertheless passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, and as President

43.

National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C.

§§

157, 163 (1947); Daniel Nelson,

What Happened to OrganizedLabor?, AM. HERITAGE (Aug. 1999), https://www.americanheritage.c

om/content/what-happened-organized-labor.

The NLRA forces employers to bargain in "good

faith," and failure to do so constitutes an "unfair labor practice." Bargainingin Good Faith with
Employees' Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)), NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/bargainring-good-faith-employeesunion-representative-section (last visited May 18, 2020).
44. The 1935 Passage ofthe Wagner Act, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD,bttps://www.nlrb.gov/wh
o-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited May 18, 2020).

45. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1937) (holding that the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, and that
the National Labor Relations Act is constitutional because it protects a fundamental right by
safeguarding unions' ability to organize and bargain collectively). The Supreme Court also found
that labor-management disputes are directly related to the flow of interstate commerce. Id.
46. See David Morris, When Unions Are Strong, Americans Enjoy the Fruits of Their Labor,
INST. FOR LOc. SELF-RELIANCE (Mar. 31, 2011), https://ilsr.org/when-unions-are-strong-americansenjoy-the-fruits-of-their-labor. Morris discusses that the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the

NLRA was the "first time the Court supported a major New Deal law." Id.
47. Id.
48. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
49. Nelson, supra note 43.
50. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Harry S. Truman: Veto of the Taft-Hartley Labor Bill,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/veto-the-taft-hartley-labor-

bill (last visited May 18, 2020).
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Truman feared, it weakened much of the progress made by the NLRA by
restricting the activities and power of private labor unions." The TaftHartley Act permits states to prohibit or limit the agency shop and
allows employees to refrain from participating in collective bargaining
activities. 52 In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act, like the NLRA, is a federal
law that applies to only the private sector; 5 3 therefore, the Act does not
provide protection for public sector employees. 54
B.

The Taylor Law: The Background ofNew York State's Public Sector
LaborLaw

The culmination of many years of labor unrest in the public sector
came to a head on New Year's Day in 1966, when a disastrous walkout
by New York City transit workers grinded the City to a halt for almost
two weeks. 5 5 The resulting economic losses totaled an estimated $100
million for each day the transit workers were on strike.5 6 For the twenty
years prior to this massive and highly disruptive strike, the
Condon-Wadlin Act governed the New York State public sector. The
Condon-Wadlin Act prohibited strikes, imposed harsh penalties on
strikers, and did not provide alternative methods to resolve collective
bargaining labor disputes.5 8Although the language of the Act made it
clear that strikes were prohibited, the Act was viewed as rather weak,
and ultimately, it was ineffective and did not have the power of deterring

51.

Id; Hunter, supra note 39.

52.

Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The NationalLabor Relations Act at the Crossroads, 56

FORDHAML. RE. 181, 182 n.12 (1987); see also Jay W. Waks, Comment, Impact ofthe Agency
Shop on Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 547 n.2 (1970) (defining
the agency shop as an agreement between an employer and union where "no employee shall be
forced to join or remain a member of a union as a condition of employment" and mandates that an
employee who opts out of membership must pay the union a fee "for acting as his agent in

collective bargaining and in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement").
53. See Colin Gordon, The Legacy of Taft-Hartley, JACOBIN (Dec. 19,
https://jacobinnag.com/2017/12/taft-hartley-unions-right-to-work.

2017),

54. F. Vincent Vernuccio, The State of CurrentPublic Sector Labor Laws, MACKINAC CTR.
FORPUB.POL'Y (June 2, 2015), https://www.mackinac.org/21334.
55. Angela M. Blassman et al., Panel: The Triborough Doctrine and Statute: A Catalyst or
Hindrance to Harmonious Labor Relations? at New York State Bar Association Conference: The

Taylor Law at 50 (May 10, 2018), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx7id
=82098.
56. Id.; Zwara, supra note 17, at 196.
57. Kristin Guild, New York State Taylor Law: Negotiating to Avoid Strikes in the Public
Sector, CORNELL UNIV. (May 1998), http://www.mildredwarner.org/gov-restructuring/special-

projects/nys-civil-service. The Condon-Wadlin Act, in effect from 1947 to 1967, was highly
ineffective; public sector employees continued to strike-even though striking was prohibited-and
the Act's harsh penalties were rarely applied. Id.
58. Id.
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strikes. 59 Further, the Act did not provide any provisions or a method for
60
workers to seek better working conditions. As a result, labor unrest
61
continued to grow and fester among the public sector. Once it became
clear that a new state labor law to govern the public sector was necessary
to combat the likelihood of a recurring crisis, work on a new public
sector law began.6 2
The Taylor Law was passed into New York law in 1967.63 Unlike
the state labor laws in some other states, the Taylor Law applies to all
4
The
public sector employers and employees in New York State.
drafters of the Taylor Law incorporated some provisions of the
Condon-Wadlin Act, such as the prohibition of strikes, in which the
Taylor Law authorizes the deduction of two day's pay for each day a
public employee strikes. 6 5 However, unlike the Condon-Wadlin Act, the
Taylor Law set up a procedure for addressing disputes that may arise
66
during collective bargaining negotiations.
The Taylor Law also deviated from the Condon-Wadlin Act by
creating the Public Employment Relations Board ("PERB"), which,
among many other tasks, oversees the enforcement of the Taylor Law
7
and issues determinations. 6 PERB is also charged with determining

59.

Labor-Management Relations, N.Y. ST., https://www.dos.ny.gov/g//handbook/html/labor

management-relations.html (last visited May 18, 2020).
60. Id
61. Id. Although many bills were introduced in the New York State Legislature between 1960
and 1963, during the height of the push toward public sector workers' rights, none of the proposed
bills were ultimately passed. Id.
62. E.J. McMahon, Taylor Made: The Cost and Consequences ofNew York's Public-Sector
Labor Laws, EMPIRE CTR. (Oct. 17, 2007), https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/taylor-made-

Committee
Taylor
The
the-cost-and-consequences-of-new-yorks-public-sector-labor-laws.
than
essential"
"more
as
viewed
be
would
groups
service
public
some
that
originally acknowledged
others but would not identify which group was being referred to by this statement. Id. The
Committee did, however, admit that a strike by any state or local government worker would be
damaging to the proper and "orderly functioning of the democratic form of representative
government." Id. Prior to the passage of the Taylor Law, the Taylor Committee rejected compulsory
arbitration as a tool to resolve an impasse. Id. Interestingly, in 1974, the New York State Legislature

amended the Taylor Law to impose compulsory interest arbitration on certain public sector groups.
Sean P. Beiter et al., News & Updates: New York Renews Binding Arbitrationfor Three More
Years, GOLDBERG SEGALLA (July 19, 2013), https://www.goldbergsegalla.com/resources/news-andupdates/new-york-renews-binding-arbitration-three-more-years. Compulsory interest arbitration is
now the mandatory, binding, and final arbitration procedure imposed on the public sector that is
made up of emergency workers who perform essential services for the public. See id

63.

McMahon, supra note 62.

64. NAT'L PUB. EMP. LAB. REL. ASS'N, ACADEMY I: THE FOUNDATION OF LABOR
2 0
RELATION 5, https://www.statenpelra.org/files/public/Academy/Resource%20Books/Academy%

Book%620I_final_2011.pdf (last visited May 18, 2020).
65. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 2020).
66. Id. § 209.
67.

Who We Are, PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (Oct. 2, 2018), http://www.perb.ny.gov. The Public

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss3/11

8

Marks: The New York State Taylor Law: Does One Size Fit All?

2020]

THE NEWYORK STATE TAYLOR LAW: DOES ONE SIZE FITALL?

807

when an impasse exists and is tasked with initiating the Taylor Law's
impasse mechanisms if an impasse arises. 6 8 One of PERB's earliest and
most important decisions involved the collective bargaining and impasse
procedures of the Taylor Law.6 9
As more and more conflicts and collective bargaining disputes
came before PERB, the New York State Legislature realized that an
amendment to the Taylor Law was not only a request by public sector
unions, but also essential to the successful operation of the Taylor Law.7 0
In 1982, the Triborough Amendment was enacted with the
understanding that as long as a public sector union does not violate the
Taylor Law's no-strike provision, it is improper for an employer to
deliberately "refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement
until a new agreement is negotiated." 7 The drafters of the Triborough
Amendment believed that this new amendment was a solution to many
of the Taylor Law's faults and would strengthen the Taylor Law overall
by appeasing public sector unions and closing the loopholes associated
with many employers' stalling of negotiations. 7 2 However, even after the
Employment Relations Board ("PERB") is considered an agency, in addition to a board, that is
required to provide impasse resolution services, as detailed further in the Taylor Law. Id.
68. Robert H. Platt, Comparison of Impasse Procedures: The New York City Collective

BargainingLawandtheNew YorkState TaylorLaw, 9 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1039,1044 (1981).
69. Triborough Bridge& Tunnel Auth. v. Dist. Council 37 &Local 1396, Am. Fed'n of State,
Cty., & Mun. Emps., 5 P.E.R.B. I 3037, 3064-65 (1972) (holding "an employee organization
which does not strike is entitled to the maintenance of the status quo during negotiations"). In this

case, an issue arose from a collective bargaining dispute between the Triborough Bridge Authority
and the transit workers' union. See Zwara, supra note 17, at 202. The Triborough Bridge Authority
refused to continue the terms of the prior agreement and PERB ruled that this amounted to bad faith
on the part of the employer because the most current agreement, even though it is expired, must
remain in effect until a new agreement is reached. Id. at 202-03.

70. Richard E. Casagrande & Deborah A. Milham, Why We Defend Triborough, N.Y. ST.
UNITED TCHRS. (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www.nysut.org/news/nysut-united/issues/2011/march2011/why-we-defend-triborough. There were various amendments added to the Taylor Law
between the enactment of the Law and 1982; however, the addition of the Triborough Amendment
to the Taylor Law signaled one of the first significant changes to the Taylor Law that impacted the
public education sector. Id Since the passage of the Triborough Amendment to the Taylor Law,
there has generally been little urgency from teachers to reach a deal on a new contract because the
terms of the expired contract remain in effect until a new contract is ratified by both parties. See
Glens Falls Post-Star, Teacher Contracts Often Allowed to Expire, EMPIRE CTR. (July 10, 2014),
https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/teacher-contracts-often-allowed-to-expire.
71. CIV. SERV. § 209-a(1)(e). Under this provision, unless a public sector union engages in a
strike, all of the provisions of the prior, expired, agreement stay in effect and remain applicable
while a successor agreement is negotiated and until a new agreement is ultimately reached.
Casagrande & Milham, supra note 70.
72. See Rosanne Mamo, A Quick Lesson on the Taylor Law and Triborough Amendment,
SEWANHAKA FED'N OF TCHRS. (Nov. 2014), http://www.sft-nea.org/images/Update_11-14.pdf. The
Triborough Amendment was enacted with the idea that it would increase labor harmony in the
public sector and maintain the status quo so both parties were incentivized to negotiate in good

faith. Id.
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enactment and implementation of the Triborough Amendment, there are
still fundamental flaws and deep-rooted issues with other provisions of
the Taylor Law.
The fundamental problems of the Taylor Law go beyond its lack of
final and binding arbitration for the public education sector; PERB has
weakened over time and has not done enough to resolve collective
74
bargaining disputes that arise in the public education sector. This
independent and neutral agency, made up of three members appointed
first
by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the
75
step toward reaching a resolution when there is an impasse. As
discussed in greater detail below, 7 6 if mediation and fact-finding are
unsuccessful, the Taylor Law takes two different routes, through either
mandatory and final arbitration, or a non-binding legislative hearing.
The route taken is completely contingent on the type of public sector
employees and employers that are involved in the impasse." Since New
York is one of the United States' most heavily unionized states,
amending the provisions and procedures of the Taylor Law would be a
catalyst for change in other states and would be the start of increased
79
fairness and equality for the public sector.
In its current form, the Taylor Law outlines two different
procedures for resolving disputes that may arise in the course of

73. Zwara, supranote 17, at 212-13.
74. See Robert D. Helsby & Thomas E. Joyner, Impact of the Taylor Law on Local
Governments, ACAD. OF POL. SCI., Dec. 1970, at 29, 29-30. Helsby and Joyner note that PERB,
which was originally created to resolve collective bargaining disputes, has since been pushed to the
sidelines in favor of the use of mediation procedures, and if needed, fact-finding boards that
determine which issues are in dispute and propose potential solutions to these issues. Id.
75. CIV. SERV. § 205.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
77. See New York State Public Employees'FairEmployment Act-The Taylor Law, N.Y. ST.
GOVERNOR'S OFF. EMP. REL., https://goer.ny.gov/new-york-state-public-employees-fair-employme

nt-act-taylor-law (last visited May 18, 2020).
78. See id.
79. Empire Ctr., HardBargain:Panel, YuTUBE (July 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MOK6E9 r5oO. The moderator of the panel notes that members of the New York Police
and Fire Retirement System are among the highest paid employees in New York's public sector
when compared with public state and local government employees, as well as public education
employees such as teachers. Id. In comparison, teachers in the New York State Teacher Retirement
System, which currently has about 428,000 active and retired members, earn pensions of, in some

cases, approximately half that of similarly situated retired police officers and firefighters. Joseph

USA
Spector, School Pensions: Check out What New York Retirees Are Earning in Your District,

TODAY (Mar. 1, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/alban
y/2018/03/01/school-pensions-check-out-what-new-york-retirees-earing-your-district/379104002;
see Justin Moore, Nearly 5,000 New York State Retirees Receiving $100k or More in Pensions,

WKBW (Aug. 10, 2018, 5:41 PM), https://www.wkbw.com/news/nearly-5000-new-york-stateretirees-receiving-100k-or-more-in-pensions.
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collective bargaining negotiations, depending on whether the employee
is a worker who provides emergency services to the public, or the
employee is a worker in the public education sector. If an impasse
occurs between a public employer and employees that provide essential
services to the public, a mediator is appointed to try to resolve the
dispute." If mediation is unsuccessful after fifteen days, a fact-finding
board is next appointed with the power to make recommendations to
resolve the issues. 8 2 The arbitration panel is authorized to conduct a
public hearing with the parties and take all necessary action to resolve
the dispute in the best interests of the employees, the employer, and the
general public. 8 3 The ultimate determination of the public arbitration
panel is final and binding on both of the parties for a period determined
by the panel. 8 4 The Taylor Law does specify, however, that the
prescribed period is not to exceed two years from the termination date of
any past collective bargaining agreement.
An impasse that occurs between a public school board and a public
school employees' union takes a different approach under the Taylor
Law's collective bargaining dispute procedure. 8 In this circumstance,
the parties may attend mediation and have the opportunity to meet with a
fact-finding board to explain their positions to potentially reach a
solution on the disputed issues or terms of the proposed contract.
However, the parties are not subject to the same final and binding
arbitration if the impasse continues over a period of time." Rather, the
public education sector is not mandated to participate in this type of
arbitration. 8 9Since the prescribed arbitration is both voluntary and not
binding on either of the parties, the Taylor Law does not provide the
public education sector with any guarantee of finality.9 0 Additionally,
80.

CIV. SERV.

§ 209.

Emergency workers, such as police officers and firefighters, provide

essential services to the public. See Kate Montgomery Swearengen, Tailoring the Taylor Law:
Restoring a Balance ofPower to Bargaining, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 513, 540-42 (2011).
Essential services are defined as "those the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal
safety or health of the whole or part of the population." Manual on Collective Bargaining and
Dispute Resolution in Public Service, INT'L LABOUR OFF., 1, 139 (2011), https://www.ilo.org/wcms
p5/groups/public/---ed dialogue/---sector/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms180600.pdf.

SERV. § 209(3).
209(4)(b).
209(4)(c)(v).
209(4)(d)(vi).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

CIv.
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id.

86.

See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Advisory Labor Arbitration Under New York Law: Does It

Have a Place in Employment Law?, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 419, 422-23 (2005).
87. CIV. SERV. § 209(3)(f).
8 8. Id
89. Id. § 209.
90.

Zwara, supra note 17, at 234-36.
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because the Triborough Amendment provides for the status quo and does
not impose any type of penalty or consequence on the parties for failing
to reach an agreement on a new contract within a reasonable amount of
time, there is often no sense of urgency to come to an agreement on a
new contract and either party can avoid settling a contract with new
terms for any variety of reasons, as long as the postponement of reaching
91
a new agreement is done in "good faith."
III. THE UNFAIR CATEGORIZATION AND UNEQUAL PROCESS OF
RESOLVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DISPUTES IN NEW YORK STATE

The lack of binding arbitration on the public education sector in
New York is a problem-not only does this provision of the Taylor Law
create a grave categorization and distinction between public sector
employees, but it also puts the public education sector on an unequal
92
playing field with other public sector workers. This Part explains the
problem with the Taylor Law in its current form and examines how a
law that all public sector employees have to adhere to, with the
exception of one specific provision, creates unfair and unequal treatment
93
for a select group of public sector workers. This Part first discusses the
circumstances surrounding a Buffalo, New York, school district dispute
that clearly outlines the implicit legal issue with the lack of final and
94
binding arbitration on the public education sector. In addition, this Part
examines a recent Supreme Court case that has limited the power of
public sector unions, and explains how this decision not only negatively
affects the public education sector in conjunction with the Taylor Law in
its current form, but also presents the reason there must be a changenow. 9 5 Finally, this Part addresses how the lack of final and binding
arbitration on the public education sector puts public school employers
and employees at a potential standstill if the parties do not agree to
attend arbitration or fail to follow the recommendation of the arbitrator if
96
the parties do attend the presently voluntary arbitration.

91. See generally The School Mandate Primer: A Guide to New York State Mandates
Impacting Our School District, CHAPPAQUA CENT. SCH. DISTRICT (Mar. 22, 2011),
https://www.ccsd.ws/uploaded/CCSD/Board ofEducation/Meetings/Presentations/Presentation_20
11-04-12 DraftSchoolMandatePrimer withRecommendations.pdf(arguing that the Triborough
Amendment removes incentives to give concessions or bargain in good faith, creating an uneven
playing field).
92. See Zwara, supra note 17, at 231-32.
93. See infra Part III.
94. See infra Part III.A.
95. See infra Part 1.B.
96. See infra Part II.C.
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Buffalo, New York, Sets the Stagefor a Series of Unfortunate Events

The public school district and public teachers' union in Buffalo,
New York, is just one model that can be used to represent the many
ongoing problems associated with New York's Taylor Law." As the
second-most populous city in New York State, after New York City, the
City of Buffalo, which encompasses Buffalo Public Schools, 9 8 is subject
to enormous financial pressure when collectively bargaining and
negotiating its public school teachers' contracts. 99 Due to the substantial
problems with the Taylor Law in its current form, most specifically the
lack of mandatory and binding arbitration, lengthy collective bargaining
disputes between Buffalo Public Schools and the Buffalo public
teachers' union, known as the Buffalo Teachers Federation, have
occurred multiple times throughout the last three decades.'o
In 1989, for example, the Buffalo public school district's contract
came up for negotiations, and the contract's contested provisions were
not resolved until 2000-a full decade after negotiations first began.'0 1
In the late 1980s, New York State public school funding was tight and
the City of Buffalo was not in the financial position to increase teachers'
salaries, which led to a collective bargaining dispute between the
teachers' union and the Buffalo Public Schools. 10 2 Following the Taylor
Law's current provisions that outline the process of handling a collective
bargaining dispute, PERB stepped in to suggest a solution.1 0 3
Unfortunately, the Board's solution was essentially ineffective and
useless, as neither party was willing to agree to the terms of the nonbinding recommendation and no compromise could be reached at that
time.104 Eventually, after nearly a decade of collective bargaining
97.
98.

See Zwara, supra note 17, at 216-22.
See School Directory, BUFFALO PUB. SCHS., https://www.buffaloschools.org/domain/35

(last visited May 18,- 2020) (outlining the sixty-five public schools that encompass the Buffalo
Public Schools).
99. Zwara, supra note 17, at 215-16; Buffalo, New York Population 2020, WORLD
POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/buffalo-population (last visited May

18, 2020) (estimating the population of the city of Buffalo to be slightly over a quarter of a million
people in 2020). There are approximately 34,000 students currently attending a public school in the
Buffalo School District. About Us, BUFF. PUB. ScHS., https://www.buffaloschools.org/Page/33 (last
visited May 18, 2020).
100. Zwara, supra note 17, at 216-22; see also Lise Bang-Jensen, Teaching Without Contracts,
EMPIRE CTR. (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/teaching-without-contracts
(noting that in 2009, the Buffalo School District, at an almost six-year collective bargaining
impasse, was the New York public school district to go the longest without a contract in the state at
that time).
101. Zwara, supra note 17, at 218.

102. Id. at 217-18.
103. Id.
104. Id. The Board suggested that the Buffalo Public Schools agree to a hefty salary increase
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disputes, contested issues, and back-and-forth negotiations, a five-year
contract took effect from 1999 to 2004, which provided teachers with
105
back pay and a salary increase.
Like clockwork, the Buffalo Public Schools' contract expired in
106
2004, and negotiations, once again, reached a standstill. Over the next
twelve years, which would turn out to be one of the longest labor
impasses between a public school district and a public teachers' union in
New York State's history, little progress would be made to hammer out
a new agreement to replace the Buffalo Public Schools' expired
contract. 10 7 The Buffalo Public Schools and the Buffalo Teachers
Federation spent over a year working to negotiate a new agreement
before declaring an impasse in August 2005.1

The parties attended

mediation sessions for years, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
Taylor Law, but the mediation failed to produce a final settlement or
109
A fact-finder was
resolution to the disputes between the parties.
an agreement, as
reach
to
effort
last-ditch
a
under
appointed in 2013,
1t 0 The fact-finder developed a list of
provided for in the Taylor Law.
proposals and recommendations for the Buffalo City School District and
the Buffalo Teachers Federation to agree on in order to reach a
settlement, but because the Taylor Law provides for nothing beyond a
for its public school teachers, but since this was a non-binding recommendation under the Taylor
Law, the Buffalo Public Schools' Superintendent rejected the Board's recommendation, and the
impasse continued. Id. at 218-19.
105. Darryl Campagna & Peter Simon, Opening-Day Relief Teachers Relent on Threat ofJob
Action, BUFF. NEWS (Sept. 6, 2000), https://buffalonews.com/2000/09/06/opening-day-reliefteachers-relent-on-threat-of-job-action; Master ContractJuly 1, 1999 Between the Buffalo Teachers,
CORNELL U., https:/digitalcommons.ilr.corell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer-https://www.goog
e.com/&httpsredir-1&article=1381&context-perbcontracts (last visited May 18, 2020).
106. See Ronald E. Kowalski, Fact-FindingReport and Recommendations, BUFF. TCHRS.
FED'N 2, http://www.btffiy.org/news/fact finder report.pdf (last visited May 18, 2020); Matt Smith,
Buffalo Teachers Protest Ruling, Contract Impasse, N.Y. ST. UNITED TCHRS. (Dec. 20, 2015),
2
https://www.nysut.org/news/nysut-united/issues/ 016/january-2016/buffalo-teachers-protest-rulingImpasse, Buffalo Teachers Seeking New
Lengthy
After
Superville,
R.
Denisa
contract-impasse;
2
Labor Pact, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/10/1 /afterlengthy-impasse-buffalo-teachers-seeking-new.html (commenting that some of the controversial
and disputed contractual issues between the Buffalo Public Schools' officials and Board of
Education, and the nearly 3600 members of the Buffalo Teachers Federation, include wage
increases, health-care contributions, and school day hours).
107. See Superville, supranote 106.
108. Kowalski, supra note 106, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. The fact-finder overseeing the Buffalo Public Schools' impasse commented on the
purpose ofa fact-finder during this final stage and described the fact-finder's responsibilities as, "to
inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dispute and make recommendations to the parties
for its settlement." Id. Many of the disputed issues brought before the fact-finder replicated the
contested issues from the prior collective bargaining dispute: wages, health insurance, work hours,
and back pay. Id. at 3.
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fact-finder's non-binding recommendations at this stage,"' the
recommendations can be, and ultimately were, ignored. 112
Finally, in October 2016, twelve long years after collective
bargaining negotiations began in the City of Buffalo, the Buffalo Public
Schools' collective bargaining dispute and impasse ended, and a new
agreement between the Buffalo Public Schools and the Buffalo Teachers
Federation was approved by a 7-2 school board vote.1 13 The reason that
it took over a decade-not just once, but twice in less than thirty yearsfor the Buffalo Public Schools and the Buffalo Teachers Federation to
compromise and reach a final agreement on salary issues and general
contractual provisions is due to the inherent flaws of the Taylor Law. 1 14
These impasses were not an anomaly; in fact, there are countless other
New York public school districts facing the same challenges caused by
the Taylor Law.'1 5 Rather than impose a final and binding procedure that
would limit the duration of an impasse and create a bright-line standard
for resolving collective bargaining disputes, the Taylor Law currently
allows a public education impasse to continue indefinitely, which
results in grave consequences for millions of students, teachers,
and communities.1 16

111.

Tiffany Lankes, Impasse with Buffalo Teachers Could Result in Taylor Law Challenge,

BUFF. NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015), https://buffalonews.com/2015/10/20/impasse-with-buffalo-teacherscould-result-in-taylor-law-challenge ("While the law lays out some options to force resolution when
municipalities and other unions remain in a stalemate-such as a binding ruling by an outside
arbitrator or a municipality's elected body-no such rule exists for teachers."). Lankes points out

that if this final step of the Taylor Law's impasse resolution procedure fails, "there is no other
remedy to jump-start negotiations." Id

112. See Kowalski, supra note 106, at 20. The language of the Taylor Law allows "such action
as is necessary and appropriate to reach an agreement." N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW

§ 209(3)(f)

(McKinney 2020).
113. See Collective BargainingAgreement Between the Buffalo Public Schools and Buffalo
Teachers Federation, BUFF. PUB. SCHS. 1, 1-4 (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.buffaloschools.org/cms
/lib/NY01913551/Centricity/domain/59/current/o20contracts/collective%20bargaining%20agreeme
nt-i.pdf; Mark Keierleber, The Last Cut: Buffalo Teachers Agree to Contract After 12-Year
Stalemate, THE 74 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.the74million.org/article/the-last-cut-buffaloteachers-agree-to-contract-after-I2-year-stalemate.
114. Zwara, supra note 17, at 222.
115. See Joe Olenick, Newfane District Declares Impasse with Teachers, LOCKPORT UNIONSUN J. (June 19, 2013), https://www.lockportjoumal.com/news/local-news/newfane-district-

declares-impasse-with-teachers/article_437c888e-23d8-5248-95d9-48e0071ca375.html.

The

Newfane Central School District, located in Niagara County, New York, is yet another example of
an impasse that could have been resolved quickly and efficiently if the Taylor Law were amended to
create a final and binding arbitration procedure. Id In 2011, the Newfane Central School District
declared an impasse after thirty-eight failed negotiation sessions with the Newfane Teachers
Association, its teachers' union, for a new contract. Id. Even though the Newfane Teachers

Association wanted to continue negotiating, "district officials felt the sides were too far apart" and
declared an impasse. Id
116. See McMahon, supra note 62.
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Don't Want to Join Your PublicSector Union
or Pay Union Fees? Now, No Problem!

The United States Supreme Court, in recently overturning a 1977
precedent, 1 1 7has already begun to weaken the power of public sector
118
In Abood v. Detroit
unions and chip away at many state labor laws.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court considered whether a state law
could lawfully compel public school teachers to join their union or pay
1 19
the union an agency fee, which is also known as a fair-share fee. Ina
unanimous decision, the Court held that public sector unions could
compel workers into paying union fees for being represented during
120
This meant that employees who did
collective bargaining negotiations.
fees to it if they benefited from
pay
to
had
nevertheless
a
union
not join
which essentially applied to
agreement,
the union's collective bargaining
12 1
all employees.
In a close 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court's June 2018 decision in
Janus v. A.F.S.CME. effectively overruled Abood by concluding that
public sector unions cannot require the collection of agency fees, which
had been mandatory in twenty-two states prior to this decision, because
the collection of these fees was deemed to be a constitutional
violation. 12 2 Previously, agency fees were deducted from public
employees' pay, regardless of whether or not the employee belonged to
the union.123 For example, New York City teachers automatically
117.
118.

Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209, 229, 241-42 (1977).
Janus v. A.F.S.C.M.E., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2456-57 (2018) (holding agency fees to be a

violation of workers' First Amendment free speech rights by forcing them to give money to an
organization they may not support or find objectionable, since teachers' unions bargain on behalfof
all employees, even those who choose not to join the union).

119.

431U.S.at209-10.

120.

See Dylan Matthews, 6 Excerpts that Explain the Supreme Court's Big Anti-Union

Ruling, VOx (June 27, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/27/17509460/supremecourt-janus-afseme-public-sector-union-alito-kagan-dissent.

121. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2456-59. Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan reflected, "[This]
decision will have large-scale consequences. Public employee unions will lose a secure source of
financial support.... Across the country, the relationships ofpublic employees and employers will
alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways." Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
122. See Dana Goldstein & Erica L. Green, What the Supreme Court's Janus Decision Means
for Teacher Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/teacherunions-fallout-supreme-court-janus.html (noting that "agency fees cover the costs of representing
nonmember teachers in contract negotiations and disputes with management"); Megan McArdle,
Why You Should Care About the Supreme Court's Janus Decision, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-may-have-klled-collective-bargainin

g/2018/06/27/9bl9bbc6-7a3c-11e8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_story.html?utm term=.495d853740bf
Prior to this decision, states that allowed public sector unions to collect agency fees tended to have
teachers with higher salaries and districts with greater school funding than teachers and districts in
states that did not allow agency fee collection. Goldstein & Green, supra.

123.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.
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became union members, but if a teacher chose to opt-out of the union,
they paid agency fees instead. 12 4 However, now that nonmembers do not
have to pay agency dues, as there is no mechanism that can mandate the
collection of these dues, and dues cannot be automatically deducted
without consent from the public employee, there is much less of an
incentive to join or stay in a public sector union. 12 5 As a result of Janus,
nonmembers can voluntarily pay agency fees, which allow them to
receive all union services except those associated with political
activities, nonmembers can voluntarily pay a fee to receive certain union
services, such as individualized representation in disciplinary actions, or
nonmembers can pay nothing, while remaining represented in collective
bargaining negotiations and reaping the benefits. 12 6
This puts public sector unions, and especially public teachers'
unions, in a tough spot. 12 7 Not only does the average teacher in the
United States earn less than a comparable worker with the same
education level, 12 8 but also, many states have already started to make
cuts to the public education sector. 12 9 Furthermore, after the ruling in
Janus, public teachers' unions must still represent both members and
nonmembers alike during collective bargaining negotiations, but now
without receiving funds from nonmembers who do not give consent to
the removal of these dues from their pay. 13 0
124. Christina Veiga, New York City Teachers Union Braces for Supreme Court Ruling that
CouldDrain Money and Members, CHALKBEAT (Feb. 22,2018), https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/n
y/2018/02/22/new-york-city-teachers-union-braces-for-supreme-court-ruling-that-could-drain-mone
y-and-members. The Supreme Court has held that nonmembers cannot be forced to pay union dues,

but they can be required to pay an agency fee for the sole purpose of collective bargaining activities,
which include collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. Commc'ns

Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1988).
125. Goldstein & Green, supra note 122. Recent commentary reflects the sentiment that the
Janus decision could result in a loss of more than 200,000 union members and millions of dollars.

Id.
126.

John H. Gross & Rose A. Nankervis, What the Janus Decision Means to Your School

District, NYSSBA (July 23, 2018), https://www.nyssba.org/news/2018/07/20/on-board-online-july23-2018/what-the-janus-decision-means-to-your-school-district. Additionally, a public teachers'
union is now only required to provide nonmembers with "negotiation and enforcement" of the terms

of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
127. Celine McNicholas, The Supreme Court's Decision on Union Dues Will Have Profound
Consequences, EDUC. WEEK (June 27, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/06/27/thesupreme-courts-decision-on-union-dues.html (commenting that there are over 8.8 million state and
local educational workers-only half of whom are union members).

128.

See Kaitlin Mulhere, This Chart Shows How Much Money College GradsAre Giving up

by Working as Teachers, MONEY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://money.com/this-chart-shows-how-much-

money-college-grads-are-giving-up-by-working-as-teachers ("Public school teachers earned average
weekly wages of $1,137 in 2017, while all other college graduates working full time earned $1,476
per week.").
129.

See McNicholas, supra note 127.

130.

Janus v. A.F.S.C.M.E., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018). One of the major issues with the
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While the Supreme Court's Janus decision means relatively little
1
for certain states, most specifically Right to Work states, 13 other states,
including New York, are certain to feel the impact of the Supreme
Court's decision. 13 2 It has been estimated that the long-term effects of
this precedent-shattering decision will reach approximately twenty-three
states and apply to at least five million workers. 13 3 The Janus decision,
which may cripple the power and strength of public teachers' unions
over time, compiled with the current inequality and ineffectiveness of
New York's Taylor Law, directly showcases the reason there is a need
for change at this time.1 34
In its current form, the Taylor Law not only creates a distinction
between the emergency public service sector and the public education
sector, but coupled with Janus, there is a further division among the
3
public education sector into nonunion members and union members. 1
In light of Janus, the New York State Legislature made some minor
adjustments to the Taylor Law to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision by incorporating amendments into the 2019 New York State
budget. 36 While some may argue that these updates were made to
protect New York's public sector unions, the new provisions do more to
now non-mandatory and non-enforceable collection of union agency fees is that a free-rider problem
is likely to result-both members and nonmembers equally benefit from collective bargaining
negotiations because nonmembers are subject to the same terms as members who contributed dues
to their union and actively bargained for their contract. Kate Walsh & Kency Nittler, Analysis: How
Will a Janus Ruling Impact Teachers and Unions in Each State? Data & Interactive Maps Tell the

Story, THE 74 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-how-will-a-janusruling-impact-teachers-and-unions-in-each-state-data-interactive-maps-tell-the-story.
131.

Right to Work, NAT'LRIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, https://nrtwc.org/facts/right-work-

mean (last visited May 18, 2020). Right to Work states make it illegal to require an employee to join
a labor union or pay dues to a union. Id. A state can become a Right to Work state by adopting a
state constitutional amendment, enacting a state statute, or both. Jackson Brainerd, Right-to-Work
Resources, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-

work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited May 18, 2020). Florida became the first Right to Work state
in 1943, and many states, such as Arizona and Nebraska, followed suit within the next three years
by passing Right to Work legislation. Michael Pearson, What's the 'Right to Work' Battle All
About?, CNN (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/right-to-work-qand-a/index.html.
132. Francie Diep, The Supreme Court Just Weakened Public-Sector Unions. What Will
Happen Next?, PAC. STANDARD (June 28, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/the-supremecourt-just-weakened-public-sector-unions-what-will-happen-next.
133. Id.
134. Colleen Wilson, New York's Unions Brace for Falloutfrom Supreme Court's Janus
Decision: Will Members Pay?, LOHUD (July 18, 2018, 7:46 AM), https://www.lohud.com/story/new
02
(citing that New York
s/education/2018/07/18/new-york-public-employee-unions-janus/7807090
State United Teachers, a teacher federation of over 600,000 union members in New York, collected
approximately S140 million in membership dues in 2017).
135. See id.
136. Id.
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clarify the effect of Janus on the collection of fees by public sector
unions than to create a better and more effective system overall. 1 37
Specifically, the amendments to the Taylor Law included changes
involving membership information and payroll deduction of dues, as
well as the modification of unions' obligations to nonunion members
under the duty of fair representation.1 38 Even with the passage of these
amendments in response to the Janus decision, the effect of the Taylor
Law on the public sector has remained unchanged.13 9
C.

Limbo: More than a Childhood Game-It Is an UnwaveringReality
for the Public EducationSector

Without amending the current collective bargaining impasse
provisions of the Taylor Law, the public education sector can remain in
limbo forever if and when a collective bargaining negotiations dispute
arises. 1 4 0If either party refuses to settle or the parties do not want to
attend arbitration, which is presently non-binding in any case, an
impasse could potentially never be resolved and may continue
indefinitely.14' Furthermore, the Taylor Law's provision that makes it
illegal for public employees to strike-and imposes huge penalties on
those who violate the law and strike anyway-disproportionately harms
the public education sector and has the power of temporarily crippling
public education sector unions. 142
As discussed in Part II,1 4 3 the Triborough Amendment was passed
to supplement the Taylor Law in an attempt to satisfy the public
education sector's demands for greater protection under the Taylor
Law.'" While proponents of the Triborough Amendment say that it has
given teachers' unions and school districts a peaceful and stable process
for negotiations in creating an acceptable procedure for collective
bargaining disputes, the Triborough Amendment has not done enough,
137. Id. The new provisions focus on situations in which a public sector union is not required
to represent a nonmember and streamline the new rights of unions in allowing union representatives

to meet with new employees to discuss union membership. Id.
138. Christopher J. Honeywell, The United States Supreme Court Decision in Janus v.
AFSCME and the Amendments to New York State's Taylor Law, HONEYWELL L. FIRM (July 2,

2018),https://www.honeywelllawfirm.com/news/2018/07/02/the-united-states-supreme-court-decisi
on-in-janus-v-afscme-and-the-amendments-to-new-york-states-taylor-law.
139. Id.
140. See Zwara, supra note 17, at 224-26.
141. Anderson et al., supra note 15, at 458.
142. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 2020). The United Federation of Teachers lost
close to $2 million in revenue, in addition to losing its dues deduction privileges for three months,
after a five-day strike in 1975. Worth, supra note 18.
143. See supra Part IIB.
144. See Mamo, supra note 72.
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and likely cannot do enough, even if it is amended, to fix the inherent
problems of the distinction in impasse procedures created by the Taylor
Law. 14 5 The Taylor Law makes it illegal for unions to strike, and those
that do strike face severe consequences. 14 6 Part of the problem with the
New York public education sector's inability to strike without enduring
the harsh penalty of losing two days of pay for each day on strike is that
the Taylor Law, compiled with the Triborough Amendment, mandates
"status quo" protections for employees who do not strike when there is a
collective bargaining dispute.147 Further, the Taylor Law's categorization
between employees who provide essential services to the public, such as
police officers and transit workers, and public education employees, like
teachers, puts teachers at an even greater disadvantage during contract
negotiations that occur during an impasse. 148
Pursuant to the current language of the Taylor Law, there are two
different procedures for addressing a public sector collective bargaining
impasse. 14 9 As described in Part II,1o the final step of the impasse
procedure for New York's public sector takes two different paths, which
145. But see Casagrande & Milham, supra note 70. Further putting New York's public
education sector at a disadvantage as compared to other public sector employees, "[t]he Triborough
Amendment gave significant added negotiating leverage to police officers and firefighters, who
(unlike other government employees in New York) have the right to binding 'interest arbitration' of
their contract impasses." Triborough Trouble, EMPIRE CTR. 6, https://www.statenpelra.org/files/pub

(last visited May 18,
lic/StatePELRAPdfs/NY%20Triborough%2OAmendment/`20Report.pdf
2020).
146. CIV. SERV. § 210.
147. Id; Mishel, supra note 10. The laws in only twelve states allow public sector employees
to go on strike and engage in work stoppages. Sean Collins, New York's "Taylor Law" Exists to
(Nov.
6, 2019),
Stop Strikes. Will the Strike Wave Change It?, STRIKE WAVE
https://www.thestrikewave.com/original-content/taylor-law. In the first half of 2018, teachers went
on strike in five states: Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. Steven

Greenhouse, Making Teachers' Strikes Illegal Won't Stop Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018),
Out of
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/teacher-strikes-illegal-arizona-carolina.html.
these five states, four of them-Arizona, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia-are Right to
Work states. Brainerd, supra note 131. Since then, teachers in more than ten other states have gone

on strike or called out of work to engage in rallies, including public school educators in Florida in
January 2020. Linda Jacobson, Tracker: Florida Teachers Rally in Tallahassee, EDUC. DIVE (Jan.

13, 2020, 8:19 AM), https://www.educationdive.com/news/tracker-teachers-on-strike/547339.
Although the Florida State Constitution does not allow public employees to strike, over a thousand
Florida public school teachers risked losing their employment to attend a rally sponsored by the
Florida Education Association, where teachers pushed for increased educational funding, smaller
class sizes, and more updated classrooms. Id.; see also Roy De Jesus, Getting Answers: Rally vs.
Strike, Why It Matters for Florida Teachers, SPECTRUM NEWS (Jan. 13, 2020, 4:24 PM),
https://www.baynews9.com/fl/tampa/news/2020/01/13/rally-vs--strike--why-it-matters-for-floridateachers.
148. See Martin H. Malin, The Motive Power in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, N.Y. ST.

BAR ASS'N (May 10, 2018), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82425.
149.
150.

See Swearengen, supra note 80, at 540-42.
See supra Part II.
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depends on the group of public sector employees a person is classified as
belonging to under the Taylor Law."' The first path, compulsory interest
arbitration, clearly applies to police officers, firefighters, and some
transit employees. 15 2 Since the determination of this form of arbitration
is binding on the parties, there is very little uncertainty as to how long it
will take for an impasse to be resolved or what the next steps are for
the parties.1

3

The second path of resolving a collective bargaining dispute applies
to the public education sector, and the final steps of the impasse
procedure are far more ambiguous and uncertain. 1 54 The Taylor Law
allows the public education sector to attend voluntary arbitration, but the
recommendations of the arbitration panel are not binding on the
parties. 1 5 5Instead, the panel's recommendations are simply a list of
suggestions that the parties can choose to implement or ignore. 1 56 In
addition, the Taylor Law provides that the parties may receive "such
assistance as may be appropriate."'s Due to the lack of finality and
clarity of this non-binding arbitration and impasse resolution procedure,
coupled with the Triborough Amendment that enforces the "status quo,"
there is no sense of urgency to negotiate or to reach an agreement,
making the entire processess entially unproductive. 5 8 Therefore, if
either the public school union or the public school district, or both
parties, do not want to compromise on certain issues and prefer to "wait
it out," 5 9 there is absolutely nothing stopping them from doing so and
going years on end without reaching an agreement-hence Buffalo
Public Schools going over a decade without a renewed contract. 16 0
151.

CIV. SERV.

§ 209(3)(f)

(establishing the term "public employer" as applying to a school

district, a community college, a state or city university of New York, and a board of cooperative
educational services).
152. Interest Arbitration, PuB. EM. REL. BOARD, http://www.perb.ny.gov/interest-arbitration

(last modified Apr. 24, 2018).
153. Id. Compulsory interest arbitration is "final and binding on the parties for a period of time
up to two years from the expiration date of any previous collective bargaining agreement." Id
154. Zwara, supra note 17, at 224-26.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f) (McKinney 2020).
Zwara, supra note 17, at 224-26.

159.

See Dale Mezzacappa, Wait for a Teachers' Contract Drags on, NOTEBOOK (Feb. 14,

2017, 8:06 AM), https://thenotebook.org/articles/2017/02/14/wait-for-a-teachers-contract-drags-on.
Mezzacappa notes that teachers in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, worked without a contract for years
due to a "historically long deadlock." Id. Some of the disputed issues included conflicts over raises
and benefits, as well as teacher preparation time and school assignments. Id. The Philadelphia
School District alleged that it could not offer the teachers a more lucrative contract due to education
cuts made in 2011 that were never made up, and both parties postponed further negotiations for

years. Id
160. CIv. SERV.

§209-a(1);

Malin, supra note 148. While the Taylor Law does mandate that
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AMENDED PROVISIONS AND STREAMLINED PROCEDURES WIL
CREATE EQUALITY, CERTAINTY, AND CONSISTENCY

Due to serious policy concerns, as well as the constantly changing
circumstances in the United States, the Taylor Law should be revised to
put the public education sector on an equal playing field with other
public sector employers and employees. 16 1 This Part first discusses the
public policy arguments for extending the mandatory process for
resolving collective bargaining impasses to the public education sector
and analyzes some of the concerns. associated with this proposed
revision. 16 2 Next, this Part explains how other states have adopted
legislation regarding public sector strikes, collective bargaining, and
impasse arbitration, as well as specifically examines the public sector
labor laws in two different states that can be used as a comparison with
New York's Taylor Law. 16 3 This Part then proposes amending section
209 of the Taylor Law to create a mandatory process of resolving
collective bargaining disputes and imposing a final and binding
arbitration procedure for all public sector employees, regardless of
whether the employee performs a so-called essential or emergency
function to the public. 16 4 Further, this Part suggests that the Taylor Law
be revised to clarify some of the terms used throughout the Taylor Law,
and proposes possible changes for these concepts, such as the allusive
"good faith" negotiation process. 165
A.

A Positive Step Toward an Inclusive Solution

The Taylor Law should be amended to create an impasse system in
which the public education sector is entitled to the same impasse
resolution process as public sector employees who are defined as
workers who perform emergency functions. 16 6 This inclusive solution is
beneficial to not only the public education sector, but also to individuals
67
As previously
and families throughout all of New York State.'
the parties negotiate in "good faith," there are many "good faith" reasons that either party would
stall or fail to reach an agreement during a collective bargaining impasse. See Anderson et al., supra
note 15, at 494-95.
161. See Rubinstein, supra note 86, at 422-23.
162. See infra Part IV.A.
163. See infra Part IV.B.
164. See infra Part IV.C.
165. See infra Part IV.C.
166. See Anthony Zumbolo, The Acceleration and Decline ofDiscord: Collective Bargaining
Impasses in New York State, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 163, 167 (2018) (noting that school
districts and other educational organizations employ the greatest number of public civil servants in
New York State).
167. Id. Section 209 of the Taylor Law includes the impasse resolution procedures that go into
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discussed, there are over two and a half million New York State public
school students. 16 8 These students, and their families, rely on public
school educators and administrators to be actively ready to perform their
jobs. 1 6 9If the Taylor Law is not amended, there is the potential for grave
consequences for the public education sector, millions of students, and
other groups of New York residents and workers who count on the
public education sector on a daily basis.17 0
There is a strong argument in favor of amending the Taylor Law to
expand the current impasse resolution procedure from covering only
emergency workers who provide essential services to the public to
covering the entire public sector, including the public education
sector."' The Taylor Law was implemented to balance two objectives:
allowing public sector workers to participate in the process of
determining the conditions of their employment, and to prevent workers
from striking by outlining fines and consequences for workers who
strike. 17 2 The Triborough Amendment was then passed as an amendment
to the Taylor Law in 1982 with the goal of increasing the effectiveness
of the collective bargaining process by requiring that all of the terms of
an expired contract remain in place and in effect until a new agreement
is negotiated and settled.1 73
effect when a collective bargaining dispute occurs. Id. While these procedures have been amended
multiple times since the passage and implementation of the Taylor Law in 1967, the mediation
requirement that is the initial intervention for the public education sector has remained unaltered
and untouched. Id.
168. See supra PartI.

169. Martin H. Malin, The Taylor Law in Context: National and International Comparisons at
New York State Bar Association Conference: The Taylor Law at 50 (May 10, 2018),
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=82425. Illinois public school students in
the Homer School District, for example, lost almost a year of schooling in 1986 when teachers went
on strike due to the inability to overcome a collective bargaining dispute. Tim Mitchell & Rebecca
Mabry, Two Decades Later, Homer Teachers Strike Still Sore Subject, NEWS-GAZETrE (Dec. 12,
2006), http://www.news-gazette.com/news/education/2006-11-12/two-decades-later-homer-teachers

-strike-still-sore-subject.html. The eight-month strike, which accounted for 156 missed school days,
eventually led to the school district's decision to merge with another school district, more than half
of the teachers involved in the strike leaving the school district, and the loss of a considerable
amount of state aid. Id.
170. Malin, supra note 148. During an Illinois teachers' strike in 2012, in which over 160
nurses and special education classroom aides walked a picket line, a circuit judge issued a
temporary restraining order and injunctive relief requiring that these "essential" employees return to
work. Bob Sunsjara, Judge Orders District 15 Nurses, Aides back to Work, DAILY HERALD (Oct.

17, 2017, 7:20 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/news/20171017/judge-orders-district-15-nursesaides-back-to-work. The court found that the absence of these public education sector workers
posed a "clear and present danger" to students' health and safety. Id.
171. Zumbolo,supra note 166.
172. Theodore W. Kheel, The Taylor Law: A CriticalExamination ofIts Virtues and Defects,
20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181, 181-82 (1968).
173. See N.Y. State Sch. Bds. Assoc., Triborough Amendment Issue Brief 2012 ST. ISSUES
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Individuals against changing or amending the Taylor Law to
include the public education sector in the compulsory arbitration
impasse resolution procedure often cite the Triborough Amendment and
claim that the Amendment does enough to protect the public education
sector.1 7 4 While the Triborough Amendment does tend to benefit
workers in the public education sector, the Amendment does not go far
enough to create the type of equality in resolving a collective bargaining
dispute or an impasse that is needed; in fact, it works with the Taylor
Law to perpetuate the lack of urgency in reaching a new contract that
has been seen for decades."'
While the public education sector is arguably not comprised of
workers who perform life-or-death functions, such as police officers, the
Taylor Law should be amended to extend the final and binding
arbitration process for an impasse that is currently only mandatory for
emergency workers. 17 6 The Triborough Amendment mandates the
maintenance of the status quo during the period of time between an
expired contract and a new contract that is agreed to by both of the
parties. 1 7 By allowing public education workers to remain under the
protections of their expired contract, the Triborough Amendment
provides more opportunity for school districts to discourage mobilization
and removes the urgency of reaching a new agreement after the previous
contract expires.' 7 8 For example, a school board may try to postpone
reaching an agreement on a new contract if it believes that the union
wants a salary increase and feels that the union is willing to hold off on
settling an agreement. 17 9 On the other hand, a school board may attempt
CONF., http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/nyssbapdf/GR-SIC-Triborough-Amendment-Issue-Br
ief.pdf (last visited May 18, 2020).
174. Id. The Triborough Amendment currently freezes the most recently expired public school
contract in effect if the union and the school board have not agreed on a new contract. Id. This
means that until a new agreement is settled on and agreed to, the terms of the expired contract
remain in place and cannot be changed unilaterally. Id. Opponents of the Triborough Amendment
argue that this should be enough to appease the public education sector in regard to the faults of and
discrepancies in the Taylor Law, especially since school districts must continue to pay any
automatic pay increments and workers keep their salary and benefits. Id
175. Blassman et al., supra note 55.

176. Id.
177.

Id. The purpose of the Triborough Amendment in regard to maintaining the status quo is

to eliminate, or limit, the public education sector's willingness to go on strike if a collective
bargaining dispute arises and a new agreement cannot quickly be reached. Id. In August 2018, New
York Democratic gubernatorial candidate Cynthia Nixon argued that the Taylor Law is "tilted
against workers." Carl Campanile, Cynthia Nixon Says Public Workers Should be Able to Strike,

N.Y. POST (Aug. 7, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/08/07/cynthia-nixon-says-publicworkers-should-be-able-to-strike.

178. Tatiana Cozzarelli & Francesca Gomes, What Is the Taylor Law?, LEFT VOICE (Dec. 7,
2017),http://www.leftvoice.org/What-is-the-Taylor-Law.
179. Id.
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to coerce a union into agreeing to a contract that is disfavored by union
members by subtly, or not so subtly, implying that continued
negotiations without ratification of the contract may result in a lower
likelihood of obtaining salary increases going forward. 1 8 0 In a bad
economy, a school board may attempt to stall the settlement of a new
contract if the terms of the expired agreement cost the district less
money than the terms of the proposed contract.' 8 Similarly, in a bad
economy, a teachers' union may seek to push off or postpone settlement
of a new contract if the union members feel that the terms of a new
contract, especially in regard to a potentially reduced salary and fewer
benefits, would be worse for its members than prolonging negotiations
so that the terms of the expired contract remain in effect for a longer
period of time.' 82
Since the status quo applies, and the Taylor Law does not provide
for a mandatory, final, or binding arbitration process for an impasse
affecting the public education sector, there is effectively no incentive to
reach an agreement and there are no consequences imposed on either a
school board or a union that takes months, or even years, to agree to a
new contract.1 8 3 Therefore, implementing an impasse resolution
180. Id. In 2014, after five years without a contract, the United Federation of Teachers
convinced employees to accept a contract that included two years of zero percent raise in back pay
and a large deduction in health benefits after being told that failure to ratify the contract meant
several more years without any raises. Id. To make the new contract's terms more appealing, a
$1000 signing bonus was added if the memorandum of agreement, or contract, was ratified soon
after the latest proposal. James Eterno, New UFT Contract: Retro Delayed = Retro Denied While
Absent
Teacher Reserves
Have
Tenure
Weakened,
MORE
(May
2,
2014),
https://morecaucusnyc.org/2014/05/02/new-contract-retro-delayed-retro-denied.
The meeting in
which this new contract was discussed is described as "a propaganda love fest." Id.

181.

Id. The economy plays an important role in a public school board's or union's willingness

to quickly negotiate a new contract, or whether to draw out negotiations over a period of time
following the expiration of the old contract. Be Careful with the Taylor Law, CORNER (Mar. 20,
2018), http://thecomer.eu/world-economylbe-careful-with-the-taylor-law/71709.
182. See Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Long-Haul Effects ofInterest Arbitration: The Case of
New York State's Taylor Law, CORNELL U. 1, 22-24 (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.nyspffa.org/main/w

p-content/uploads/2013/02/NYSPFFA-ALARM-Cornell-MIT-Study-on-the-Effects-of-Binding-Arb
itration-2009.pdf (arguing that the length of time between the expiration of an old contract and the
issuance of a new contract after an arbitration award has greatly increased over the past three
decades, in part because the arbitration awards include retroactive salary increases when the past
contract has already expired, meaning that the longer the delay in reaching an agreement, the greater
the lump-sum retroactive payment).

183. See CSEA Legal Department, Taylor Law Manual: A Guide for CSEA Labor Relations
Staff, CSEA 1, 18-22 (Jan. 2014), http://csea860.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Taylor-LawManual.pdf. Pursuant to the Taylor Law, a public employer and a union must both negotiate in good

faith. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW

§ 209-a()(d)

(McKinney 2020). However, the term "good faith" is

fairly vague and it is unclear as to what encompasses a good faith effort, aside from "the duty not to
act unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject of negotiation." CSEA Legal Department,

supra, at 8-9. The term "good faith" is not defined or described more fully anywhere in the Taylor
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procedure in which public education school boards and unions alike
cannot procrastinate in reaching a final contract to replace an expired
agreement would be fair and beneficial to all involved: educators,
administrators, school boards, students, parents, and families, among
many other groups.184
B.

State by State: Using Two States'LaborLaws
as a Comparison with New York

As federal labor laws tended to backtrack and weaken private sector
unions in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, the need for new
labor laws covering both the private and public sectors arose, and states
began to pass their own laws to safeguard the rights of public sector
workers' unions. 1 8 In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to pass
labor legislation to protect collective bargaining and public sector
unions, and a plethora of states immediately followed.' Many states
enacted laws that granted public sector unions the right to collectively
bargain in contract negotiations, while some states passed laws
authorizing unions to strike, and other states passed Right to Work
laws. 8 7 These various public sector labor laws can be broken down into
the following four categories: states with a single comprehensive law
covering multiple occupations, such as New York; states with a separate
law for each occupation, like Illinois; states with a law for only some
occupations, like Oklahoma; and states with no public sector labor

/

Law. Civ. SERV. § 201.
184. But see State ofNew York Legislative Document 1972 Report-Number 25, JOINT LEGIS.
20 8
1
COMMTTEE ON THE TAYLOR L. 1, 32-33 (1972), http://www.perb.ny.gov/wp-content/uploads/

04/1971JLC.pdf (noting that "the test of impasse procedures is in part the acceptability of
agreements reached and not solely the reaching of agreements").

185.

See Vernuccio, supra note 54 (noting that collective bargaining in the public sector is

primarily governed by state laws, which did not come into existence until the late 1950s).

186. Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin's Legacyfor Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), https://
Prior to Wisconsin
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/business/wisconsins-legacy-for-unions.htm.
1959, thus allowing
in
law
labor
sector
public
first
nation's
the
signing
Nelson
Gaylord
Governor

public sector unions in Wisconsin the right to negotiate their contracts and bargain collectively, only
private sector unions had a government-protected right to bargain collectively. Id. However,
Wisconsin's public sector union labor law is somewhat limited, especially as compared with other
public sector labor laws passed soon after Wisconsin's law was enacted. Id. In fact, Wisconsin's
labor leaders and union members are limited to negotiating for base pay, and little else, under

Wisconsin Act 10.

Emily Zantow,

Wisconsin Unions Fight Collective-Bargaining Limits,

COURTHOUSE NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wisconsin-unions-fightcollective-bargaining-limits.
187. Steven Greenhouse, A Watershed Moment for Public-Sector Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.

9
19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/us/1 union.html. As of February 2017, twenty-

eight states are Right to Work states. Brainerd, supra note 131.
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law.' 8 8 There are various components of the provisions of the public
sector labor laws in Illinois and Oklahoma that can be used as a
comparison with the Taylor Law in New York State.18 9
1. Illinois's Separation and Division of Labor Laws
In 1983, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act ("IPLRA") to grant public sector employees the
right to organize and collectively bargain. 1 9 0 That same year, a second
law, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act ("IELRA"), was
passed in Illinois to extend various protections to public sector
educational employees.' 9 'Together, the IPLRA and the IELRA cover all
public sector employees in Illinois.1 92
The IELRA specifically applies to the Illinois public education
sector.' 9 3 This law provides employees in the public education sector
with the right to form and join an employee organization, such as a
union.' 9 4 The IELRA prohibits educational employees employed in
school districts in cities of over 500,000 inhabitants from going on
strike, and a penalty, which may include discipline by the employer and

188.

Robert Hebdon, Public Sector Labor Policy: A Human Rights Approach, 14 NEV. L.J.

509, 512 (2014). Aside from New York, states with a single comprehensive law that covers multiple
occupations include Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,

New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia. Id. Besides Illinois, states
with a separate law for each occupation include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Id. In addition to Oklahoma, states with a law for only some occupations include Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, and Wyoming. Id. States that do not have an applicable public sector labor law include

Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. With the exception of Colorado, all of the states that do not have a
public sector labor law are Right to Work states. Brainerd, supra note 131.

189.
190.

See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/7 (West 2014) (providing that the parties may choose, "by

mutual agreement," to attend arbitration if an impasse occurs and the parties cannot agree on
conditions of employment to be included in a collective bargaining agreement); Martin H. Malin,
Implementing the Illinois EducationalLabor Relations Act, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 101, 101 (1985).

191.

Malin, supra note 190.

192.

Labor and Employment in

the State of Illinois, FISHER

& PHILLIPS

LLP

3,

https://www.fisherphillips.com/media/publication/5339_59988_Illinois%20State%20Law%2OBook
let%20_Revised%202015.pdf (last visited May 18, 2020).
193. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2 (West 2020); Sally J. Whiteside et al., Illinois Public
Labor Relations Law: A Commentary and Analysis, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 887 (1985). Under

the IELRA, an educational employee is defined as an individual, excluding students, supervisors,
short term employees, confidential and managerial

employees, part-time community

college

employees employed by an educational employer, and elected officials. Id. at 5/2(b). An educational
employer is "the governing body of a public school district, including [a] . .. public school
district ...

194.

public community college district or State college or university . . . ." Id. at 5/2(a).

Id. at 5/3.
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loss of compensation, is imposed on those who do go on strike."' The
law also creates a duty for an educational employer and a public school
union to collectively bargain on issues including wages and terms
and conditions of employment. 96 The law was amended after it
was originally passed to create the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board.

97

The IELRA sets forth an impasse procedure that applies when a
collective bargaining dispute arises between an educational employer
that is not in a city of more than 500,000 inhabitants and an educational
employees' union.' 9 8 Essentially, the parties must notify the Board if
they do not reach an agreement during negotiations by ninety days
99
before the start of the upcoming school year.1 If, after spending a
reasonable amount of time negotiating, and within ninety days of the
start of the upcoming school year, the parties have reached an impasse,
either party may request the Board to initiate mediation, or the Board
may invoke mediation on its own accord if the parties fail to reach an
agreement within forty-five days of the start of the upcoming school
2 00
Each party must
year and the parties have not requested mediation.
submit to the mediator, the Board, and the other party, a summary of the
new offer, which is posted and remains on the Board's website until an
agreement is reached.2 0
The IELRA also includes a procedure for collective bargaining
disputes that arise between an educational employer that is in a city of
over 500,000 inhabitants and an educational employees' union.2 0 2 Here,
if the parties do not reach an agreement after a reasonable period of
203 The fact-finder is
mediation, the dispute is submitted to fact-finding.
empowered to conduct hearings, attempt mediation, and require both
204
parties to submit their final offers for disputed issues. If the dispute is
not settled in seventy-five days, the fact-finder must issue a report to the
parties with advisory findings of fact and recommended terms of
settlement, which are deemed agreed on as a final resolution to the
disputed issues unless either party submits a notice of rejection, with
rationale as to why it is rejected, within fifteen days of receiving the
195. Id at 5/13; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-1.01 (West 2020).
196.

115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10(a) (West 2020).

197. Id at 5/5.
198. Id. at 5/12.
199. Id
200. Id
201. Id at 5/12(a-5)(2).
202. Id at 5/12(a-10).
203. Id at 5/12(a-10)(1).
204. Id at 5/12(a-10)(3).
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report.205 After this stage, the IELRA is fairly unclear on what happens
next, and how the parties should proceed, which does lead to
some ambiguity. 20 6

2. Oklahoma's Individualized Labor Laws
Oklahoma has enacted three statutes to cover certain public sector
workers: police officers and firefighters, school employees, and
municipal employees. 2 0 7The statute covering school employees deals in
great part with negotiations between school employees' unions and
school districts. 20 8 First, the statute makes it illegal for a union to strike
or threaten to strike as a way to resolve a collective bargaining
dispute. 20 9Any member of a union who strikes is denied the full amount
of their wages for the period of the violation. 2 1 0 It is important to note
that as a Right to Work state, union membership in Oklahoma is
completely optional andvoluntary.2 11
There is also a procedure for resolving an impasse that occurs
during collective bargaining negotiations. 2 1 2If there is an impasse, the
items that cannot be resolved are referred to a fact-finding committee,
and the chosen chairperson of that committee is obligated to present
written recommendations to the union and the school board within
twenty days of being selected. 2 13Then, if either party rejects any of the
committee's recommendations, that party must request a meeting of the
representatives who negotiated for the school board and the union within
seven days. 2 1 4 At the meeting, the representatives are to exzhange
written statements with each other and with the committee. 21 5 The
parties are expected to attempt to resolve any remaining differences in
good
faith,

205. Id. at 5/12(a-10)(5).
206. Id.
&

207. AFSCME, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Laws, AM. FED'N OF ST., COUNTY
MUN. EMPS., https://web.archive.org/web/20190114144617/https://www.afscme.org/news/publicati

ons/for-leaders/public-sector-collective-bargaining-laws (last visited May 18, 2020).
208.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,

§ 509.1

(West 2020).

209. Id. § 509.8.
210. Id.
211.

Emily Sullivan, Union Leader Calls for an End to Oklahoma Teachers' 9-Day Strike,

NPR (Apr. 21, 2018, 1:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/14/602462055/u
nion-leader-calls-for-an-end-to-oklahoma-teachers-9-day-strike.

212.

§ 509.7.

213. Id. In the state of Oklahoma, a collective bargaining impasse exists where "negotiations
are not successfully concluded by the first day of school" or where either party declares an impasse

prior to the first day of school. Id.
214. § 509.7(D).
215. Id.
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and for the following fourteen days, the representative must try to
216
resolve these issues before discontinuing his or her efforts.
Next, a copy of the fact-finding report is to be filed with the
Oklahoma State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 2 1 7 If, at this point,
the collective bargaining differences and issues between the parties are
resolved, the parties are to draft a written agreement that addresses the
2 18
agreed upon issues, and present that agreement for ratification.
However, if the parties' differences remain unresolved and they cannot
reach a compromise or a solution to end the collective bargaining
impasse, the school board must send the Oklahoma State Superintendent
of Public Instruction "its final disposition of the negotiations impasse
2 19
process within thirty days of the effective date of implementation."
There are no specific guidelines set forth by statute as to what
information should be included in the school board's final disposition to
220
the Oklahoma State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
C. Imposing Mandatoryand BindingArbitration While Creating
Clarity
The present distinction in the Taylor Law, which creates a division
in the collective bargaining dispute and impasse resolution procedure
between emergency workers, who provide essential services to the
general public, and the public education sector, should be removed and
replaced with a mandatory and binding arbitration process for all public
sector employees. 221 This mandatory arbitration process should be final
for both public sector employees and employers so neither party can
delay the process of reaching a resolution during a collective bargaining
impasse.22 2 Further, the "good faith" negotiations standard that is
currently imposed under the Taylor Law should be clarified and
concretely defined to be more understandable for the parties
223
to interpret.
Additionally, the Taylor Law's current procedures for the public
education sector's impasse arbitration leaves important collective
bargaining dispute procedures up to interpretation and perpetuates the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id
Id § 509.7(E).
Id
Id
Id
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW
Guild, supra note 57.

223.

Id.

§ 209 (McKinney

2020).
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open-ended process of resolving an impasse that may arise during
negotiations involving the public education sector.2 2 4 Including the
public education sector in the mandatory, binding, and final arbitration
process that is currently only imposed on emergency workers,2 2 5 and
ensuring that this streamlined and uniform procedure is followed and
overseen by PERB, 2 2 6 is significant, not only for the longevity and
success of the Taylor Law, but also for the entire public sector that
utilizes these procedures when there is an impasse during contract
negotiations. 2 2 7Further, following the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Janus that puts increased pressure on public sector unions and could
potentially cripple much of their power through the modification of dues
deduction requirements, 2 2 8public sector unions, and especially public
education unions, need protection under the Taylor Law more than ever
before. 2 2 9This proposed modification to the Taylor Law would help
rebalance the inequality in bargaining power and push toward increased
fairness for the entire New York State public sector.2 3 0
This Note offers a solution to the Taylor Law's current discrepancy
in how a collective bargaining dispute and an impasse are resolved.2 3 1
This solution provides for the removal of the distinction between
emergency workers who perform essential functions, who currently must
attend final and binding interest arbitration when an impasse occurs, and
the public education sector, which is presently subject to voluntary
arbitration if mediation and fact-finding cannot resolve the collective
bargaining dispute. 2 3 2 Essentially, the provisions of the Taylor Law,
most specifically section 209(3)(f), that separate the public education

224.

See Zwara, supra note 17, at 205-06.

225.
226.

CIV. SERV. § 209(3).
See id.

227. But see Erin Audra Russ, Note, Strike Three-You're Out! Revamping the New York State
Taylor Law in Response to Three Transport Workers'Strikes, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163,
200-01 (2007) (arguing that arbitration should be voluntary, and not compulsory, because forced
arbitration is frequently disfavored by commentators as a less peaceful method of resolving a
dispute as compared to advisory arbitration, which is not binding on the parties).

228. Janus v. A.F.S.C.M.E., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 (2018); Wilson, supra note 134.
229.
230.

See Wilson, supra note 134.
See Scott Horton, New York Protects Public Sector Unions, HORTON MGMT. L. (Apr. 19,

2018), https://hortonpllc.com/new-york-protects-public-sector-unions.

On April 12, 2018, New

York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed a bill containing new legal protections for public unions
that represent government employees to begin protecting public sector unions from the fallout of

Janus. Id. Since the signing of this State Budget bill, it appears that little else has been done to
protect unions from the implications of the decision in Janus, which effectively ruled against public
sector unions. See generally Scott Horton, Supreme Court Rules Against Public Unions, HORTON

MGMT. L. (June 28, 2018), https://hortonpllc.com/supreme-court-rules-against-public-unions.
231.

See supra Part IV.A.

232.

N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §209(3)(f) (McKinney 2020).
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sector into its own group, should be removed in full. 2 3 3 Additionally, to
234
as well as to
address the strong policy arguments discussed above,
entire public
State's
York
New
throughout
fairness
and
create equality
209(4) of
section
sector, the New York State Legislature should amend
the Taylor Law to cover the public education sector and apply to a
collective bargaining dispute or an impasse in which "the public
employer is a school district, a board of cooperative educational
services, a community college, the state university of New York, or the
city university of New York." 23 5 This language aptly describes the
portion of the public education sector to which the Taylor Law applies,
and does not require any immediate change. 2 3 6 Removing section
209(3)(f) of the Taylor Law completely and adding the public education
sector to the groups of the public sector that are entitled to mandatory,
binding, and final arbitration during an impasse is the first step toward
creating real change, equality, and fairness in New York State's public
sector labor laws.2 3 7
Finally, it would be incredibly useful to create a definition for, or at
the minimum a description of, the allusive "good faith" negotiations that
public sector employers and unions are expected to maintain during a
collective bargaining dispute when seeking to reach a new contract
agreement under the Taylor Law.2 3 8 Currently, the Taylor Law provides
for a public employer and employee organization, such as a union, to
meet and confer at reasonable times and in good faith during contract
233. Id.
234. See supra Part IV.A.
235. See Civ. SERV. § 209(3)(f). This language is taken directly from the current provisions of
the Taylor Law in regard to which segments of the public education sector are included under the

Law. Id. This description of the public education sector should remain consistent in an amended
Taylor Law, but should be moved to Section 209(4) when Section 209(3)(f) is eliminated, so that
Section 209(4) encompasses both the emergency public sector and the public education sector. Id.
This simple change alone would make a large difference in the impact of the Taylor Law on the
public education sector and would increase equality and fairness under the Law. See generally The
Taylor Law, UNITED TcHRS. NORTHPORT, https://unitedteachersofnorthport.com/the-taylor-law (last

visited May 18, 2020).
236. See generally James E. Freeman & Peter Kolozi, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Public Sector Unions and New York's Triborough Amendment, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N,

http://www.nea.org/home/68493.htm (last visited May 18, 2020) (finding that the difficulty of
reaching a new agreement under the current Taylor Law extends throughout the entire public

education sector, and noting that the City University of New York ("CUNY"), which is a public
higher education entity that fits precisely within the Taylor Law's present definition of a public
employer, failed to come to an agreement with the CUNY union, resulting in about 25,000 faculty
and staff members working without a contract for six years).
237. See Lieberwitz et al., supra note 19.

238. CIv. SERV. § 204(3). While the Taylor Law does begin with a section that includes many
definitions used throughout the Taylor Law, the term "good faith" is noticeably missing from this
section and is not described in any other provision or section of the Law. Id. § 201.
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negotiations, but the Taylor Law's good faith requirement "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 2 3 9 Interestingly, other state labor laws that apply to the
public sector also use the term "good faith," and some of these laws,
most notably Oklahoma's laws, do define what constitutes a good
faith effort.24 0
Oklahoma's public sector labor law, as discussed in greater detail
above, 2 4 1 requiresa good faith effort in resolving differences between an
employer and employee when there is an impasse.2 4 2 Oklahoma's law
also includes a specific section detailing what it means to negotiate in
good faith, and this language should be slightly tweaked and then added
to the Taylor Law's definition section to provide the following: "To
negotiate in good faith means both parties must consider proposals in an
effort to find a mutually satisfactory basis for agreement and must
discuss their respective contract proposals. If a party objects to the other
party's contract proposal, then the objecting party must support its
objections with rationale." 24 3 Additionally, imposing a penalty on a party
for failing to negotiate in good faith would further incentivize the parties
to reach an agreement in a timely fashion and discourage either party
from stalling or prolonging negotiations. 2
Including language in the definition section of the Taylor Law that
specifically defines the term "good faith" serves at least two important
purposes. 2 4 5First, this language would remove much of the ambiguity as
to what "good faith" means because there would be a clear definition,
which would in turn ultimately avoid some of the litigation that currently
arises due to collective bargaining disputes.2 4 6 Second, this definition
would help to eliminate some of the delays in contract negotiations that
currently occur when a party offers a proposed agreement with
disfavored terms. 2 4 7The inclusion of this definition would mandate that
the party objecting to some or all of the terms must provide the other
party with an explanation or rationale as to why the terms are
disfavored. 2 4 8The possibility of shortening the negotiation process when
239. Id. § 204(3).
240. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,

§ 509.6 (West

2020).

241.

See supra text accompanying notes 207-20.

242.
243.

Tit. 70, § 509.7(D).
CIV. SERV. § 201; Tit. 70, § 509.6.

244.

See Swearengen, supra note 80, at 543-46 (offering a payment of restitution or a payment

toward a public fund as two possible consequences for a party's failure to bargain in good faith).
245. CIv. SERV. § 201; Swearengen, supra note 80, at 545-46.
246.
247.

See Lieberwitz et al., supra note 19.
Swearengen, supra note 80, at 545-46.

248. Id.
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there is a collective bargaining dispute and resolving an impasse quickly
and rationally, perhaps without the need to turn to mediation, factfinding, or even arbitration altogether, would benefit the public sector in
terms of money, resources, and ultimately the court system, should
litigation arise between the parties. 2 4 9 Adding this language to the Taylor
Law, in conjunction with removing the distinction between the public
education sector and the emergency public sector in regard to arbitration,
is a positive and necessary step toward strengthening the Taylor Law
and promoting equality, fairness, and swiftness in resolving a collective
bargaining dispute or an impasse for the entire New York State
public sector.2 5 0
V.

CONCLUSION

Public sector employees have made great strides in achieving more
favorable labor laws that protect the right to join a union and collectively
bargain. 2 5 1While many different groups of workers make up the public
sector, public education workers are undoubtedly a large component of
this population. 2 5 2New York State's public sector labor law, coined the
Taylor Law, currently creates a process for a collective bargaining
dispute and an impasse resolution procedure in which some groups of
the public sector are entitled to mandatory, final, and binding
compulsory arbitration, while members of the public education sector do
not enjoy that same sense of finality and resolve.2 5 3
As seen countless times over the past few decades, many public
sector educational employees are left to work without an updated
contract, and collective bargaining disputes have continued indefinitely,

249.
250.

Zumbolo, supra note 166.
Lieberwitz et al., supra note 19. See also John H. Gross, Panel: The Potential Demise of

the Agency Fee and Its Impact on Management and Unions at New York State Bar Association

Conference: The Taylor Law at 50 (May 10, 2018), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAss
et.aspx?id=82425 (noting that teachers' unions have been a part of American society since the late
1800s and since they have played such an important and significant role in shaping the public
education sector throughout the history of the United States, they deserve equality under the Taylor
Law and the same rights as other public sector employees). At the present time, a legislative change
is needed to strengthen the Taylor Law to create fairness throughout the public sector and to achieve
greater protection for teachers' unions in the public education sector. See Zwara, supra note 17, at
208-09.
251. See Warner, supra note 8.
252.

New York State Education at a Glance, N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP'T, https://data.nysed.gov (last

visited May 18, 2020) (calculating that there are over 212,000 public school teachers in New York
State). There are 732 school districts and more than 4430 public schools in New York State. Id.
Additionally, during the 2018-2019 school year, there were over 2,600,000 public school students in
kindergarten through twelfth grade in New York State. Id.
253. Zwara, supra note 17, at 224-26.
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leaving at times thousands of workers in a state of limbo and creating
havoc for teachers, students, and communities. 2 5 4 Additionally, the
recent Supreme Court decision in Janus has only created a greater
challenge for public sector unions, and the consequences of this decision
have not yet been fully exposed. 2 55 Eliminating the distinction between
the public education sector and emergency workers who perform
essential services for the public, and creating a single, uniform impasse
resolution procedure in which the entire public sector is entitled to
mandatory, final, and binding arbitration, is a positive step. 2 5 6 This
solution works toward achieving equality and uniformity for all
members of New York State's public sector under the Taylor Law.2 5 7
Rebecca L. Marks*

254. See supra Part III.C. Recently, almost 30,000 California teachers in the Los Angeles
Unified School District, which is the second largest school system in the country with a
33,000-member union and more than 600,000 students, went on strike after two years of contract
negotiations produced no results regarding higher pay and smaller class sizes. Valerie Strauss, The
Los Angeles Teachers Strike, as Told in a Dozen Tweets, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/01/15/los-angeles-teachers-strike-told-dozentweets/?noredirect-on&utmterm=.b098bal37cl8. While schools in Los Angeles were kept open
for the duration of the strike, the learning process was greatly disrupted as over 400 substitutes were
hired and 2000 personnel members were temporarily assigned to Los Angeles schools to work as
teachers, counselors, and librarians. Id.
255.
256.
257.

See supra Part IH.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.
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